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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent popularity of the Internet 1 and on-line gambling in
particular has provided some hotly debated legal issues, many
of which are yet to be decided. One issue is whether credit card
companies can enforce debts incurred while gambling on-line.
Most of the "virtual casinos" visited by Americans are based in
other countries, such as Belize, Antigua and the Dutch Antil-
les. 2 Thus, on-line gambling is forcing the legal field to revisit
traditional standards, such as jurisdiction, sovereignty and in-
ternational comity. This paper will discuss the problems inher-
ent in using outdated legal concepts to address the new
phenomenon of the Internet in general and on-line gambling
specifically.
Gambling on the Internet is growing by leaps and bounds.
In 1998 it was estimated that over $600 million would be wa-
gered online by Americans. 3 Market analyst, Datamonitor,
predicts that by the year 2002 this figure will rise to $10 bil-
lion.4 To put this into perspective, $10 billion represents one
fourth of the legal gambling revenue collected in the United
States in 1995.5
A recently filed lawsuit in California, if successful, could
spell the end of the Internet gambling industry in the United
1 The Internet is a huge web of approximately 30,000 interconnected com-
puter networks, spanning the entire planet. It was established in the 1960's as a
military network to provide a fail-safe system that could be fully activated in the
event of war or public emergency. Phaedra Hise, NET PROFIT, INC., Oct. 1994, at
80. "The Internet is the world's largest computer network, often described as a
'network of networks.' Computer networks are systems of interconnected com-
puters that allow the exchange of information between the connected computers."
EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW: YOUR RIGHTS
AND DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WORLD 2-11 (1994).
2 Joshua Quittner, Betting on Virtual Vegas; To Get Around U.S. Gambling
Laws, the First Online Casinos are Setting up Their Card Tables Offshore, TIME,
June 12, 1995, at 63.
3 See Michael O'D. Moore, Internet Gambler's Suit Puts Cards on the Spot,
AMERICAN BANKER, Aug. 27, 1998.
4 See Moira Muldoon, Gamers Raise Senate's Bet, Wired News, (visited Nov.
9, 1998) <http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/14263.html>.
5 See Chance a Flutter on the Internet; Hi-tech Firms Scent Big Profits as
Betting and Blackjack Make Their Debuts on the Information Superhighway, EVE-
NING STANDARD, June 5, 1995, at 38.
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States. 6 In this lawsuit, Providian National Bank v. Haines,
the plaintiff is attempting to nullify $70,000 worth of debts in-
curred while gambling on-line. 7 The theory behind the suit is
that since gambling is illegal in California and there is strong
public policy against enforcing debts for gambling on credit, the
court should declare the credit card debts void as against public
policy." The suit also alleges unfair business practices on the
part of Visa and MasterCard, in that they allowed their
merchant accounts to mislead consumers into believing gam-
bling is legal in California. 9 The suit also seeks an injunction
barring the credit card companies and their issuing banks from
collecting any Internet gambling debts. 10
If the California courts do hold that on-line gambling debts
are unenforceable, it could be the beginning of the end for this
multi-million dollar industry.1" It is not hard to see why, as
credit cards logically are the payment type of choice, as the only
practical means of quickly setting up an account with an on-line
casino.12 According to I. Nelson Rose, a gambling law expert,
"anything else is too slow."1 3 If they cannot use credit cards,
virtual casinos will be doomed.' 4 In this author's opinion, there
is a good chance that the California courts will be the first to
announce that on-line gambling debts are unenforceable, based
on public policy considerations and a long line of precedent.
The very nature of the Internet challenges the traditional
legal standards and laws that were enacted before its existence.
Part II of this comment will discuss the traditional standards,
such as the tests for asserting personal jurisdiction over non-
residents and the Federal statutes currently being applied to
the Internet. Their effectiveness and reasonableness will also
be addressed. Part II will also discuss the opinions of the Inter-
6 See Matt Beer, Suit Challenges On-Line Casinos, S. F. ExAM., Aug. 17,
1998; Providian National Bank v. Haines, No. V980858 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 23,
1998) [hereinafter Cross Complaint].
7 See Cross Complaint, supra note 6.
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See id.
11 See Beer, supra note 6. (quoting the opinion of I. Nelson Rose, Whittier
College law professor and American Bar Association gambling expert).
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id.
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active Gaming Council and its attempt to regulate on-line gam-
bling internally. Part III will discuss the recently filed Haines
lawsuit and the favorable precedent upon which it relies. Part
III will also analyze this lawsuit and the precedential support,
which makes a key distinction between public policy considera-
tions involving gambling and gambling on credit. Part IV will
state the conclusion that the Haines case should succeed based
on the law and precedent in California and that this could sig-
nal the end of on-line gambling in the United States. Part IV
will also conclude that the tests for asserting jurisdiction over
Internet gambling sites are antiquated but can work. The Fed-
eral and state statutes currently being used to combat on-line
gambling need to be revised or new legislation needs to be
passed.
II. TRADITIONAL STANDARDS
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Since by its very nature the world wide web knows no
boundaries and Internet sites can be accessed from anywhere
on the globe, the question of asserting jurisdiction will necessa-
rily arise in Internet cases. For a federal district court to exer-
cise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, it
applies the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits. 15
These long-arm statutes must comport with the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. 16 The traditional due process test for in personam juris-
diction is the "minimum contacts" test, first announced by the
Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washing-
ton.' 7 Under the minimum contacts test the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state must be such that the exercise of
jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."18 In order to satisfy the due process re-
quirement the defendant's conduct and connection with the fo-
rum state must be such that he should reasonably anticipate
15 See Howard v. Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(quoting Ensign-Bickford Co. v. ICI Explosives USA Inc., 817 F. Supp. at 1026
(D.Conn. 1993)).
16 See id.
17 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
18 Id. at 316.
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being haled into court there.19 The due process requirement
protects non-resident defendants from the burdens of litigating
claims where they have not created a "substantial connection"
with the forum state. 20
Although worded differently and fact sensitive, the courts
have for the most part settled on a three-part test for finding
minimum contacts, so as to confer in personam jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant. 21 The first requirement is that the
defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of conducting business in the state, and thus, availed itself of
the benefits and protections of the courts.22 Second, the claim
must arise or result from the defendant's forum related activi-
ties.23 Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. 24
In the past this test has not always been simple to administer,
and with geographic lines becoming blurred as more and more
business is conducted over the Internet, the three-part test has
become a gray area of the law.25
One inherent feature of Internet activity is its indifference
to traditional geographical borders erected by states and na-
tions. 26 Over the Internet, people and businesses regularly
19 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
20 See id. at 297.
21 See John Gibeaut, Questions of Authority: Jurisdiction Cases Crop As In-
ternet Sales Erase Borders, ABA JOURNAL, June 1997, at 42.
22 See Hanson v. Deckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). In Hanson, the Supreme
Court outlined when a state court does not have personal jurisdiction over an out
of state defendant. A wealthy Pennsylvania widow had a trust with a Delaware
bank. She moved to Florida and continued to do business with the Delaware bank.
The Supreme Court held that the Florida court could not assert personal jurisdic-
tion over the Delaware bank because there was no relevant contact with the forum
State. The Court reasoned that since the bank did not solicit business in Florida
and its contact with that State resulted from one of its customers moving there, it
could not be shown that the bank had reached out to the forum state or purpose-
fully availed itself of the privilege of doing buisness there. Id; cf. McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (upholding California court's assertion of
personal jurisdiction over Texas insurance company that sold only one policy in
California, where defendant solicited business in state, the claim arose from defen-
dant's contact with state, and California had a strong interest in providing its citi-
zens with a forum).
23 See Cybersell v. Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997).
24 See id. at 416.
25 See Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 42.
26 See Thomas O'Toole, Civil Procedure - Personal Jurisdiction: Familiar No-
tions of Fairness, Foreseeability Dwell Uneasily In Borderless Online World, U.S.
LAw WEEK, July 1, 1997.
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communicate with each other without knowing for sure where
the other party physically resides in the "real world."27 Not sur-
prisingly, this fact has confounded the courts that have ad-
dressed the issue of asserting personal jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants, whose contact with the forum state arises
out of communications via the Internet. 28
This gray area of the law is best evidenced by the decisions
of courts who have addressed the issue of asserting personal ju-
risdiction over defendants whose only contact with the forum
state is through its website. At this time only the Second, Sixth
and Ninth Circuits have addressed the issue of personal juris-
diction in "website only" cases, and they are split on the an-
swer.29 In CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson the Sixth Circuit
found that defendant had purposefully availed himself of the fo-
rum State where he had entered into a contract in Ohio and
transmitted software to plaintiff there.30 The court in Patterson
stressed that it was both entering into the contract and placing
the software in the stream of commerce which made the defen-
dant amenable to suit in Ohio, and that either act alone would
not have been sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 31 The Patterson
court also stated that it is the quality of defendant's contacts
and not their number or status, that will determine purposeful
availment for purposes of asserting personal jurisdiction. 32
In another "website only" case,33 the Ninth Circuit refused
to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident website ad-
vertiser who had no contacts with Arizona other than maintain-
ing a home page that is accessible to Arizonans, and everyone
else over the Internet.34 The Cybersell court refused to accept
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); see also CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d.
1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Cybersell v. Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997).
30 89 F.3d. 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996).
31 See id. at 1265, see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478;
compare Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112, 117 (1987)
(O'Connor, J) (plurality opinion) ("The placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed at the
forum State.") with id., at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (rejecting the plu-
rality's position on the stream of commerce theory).
32 See CompuServe, Inc., 89 F.3d. at 1265.
33 See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 416.
34 See id. at 415.
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plaintiffs argument that Cyberspace is without borders and
that by advertising its service on the Internet, defendant neces-
sarily intended that it be used on a world wide basis. 35 The
court stated that use of the Internet alone, without conducting
commercial activity over the Internet in the forum State or pur-
posefully directing its merchandising efforts towards Arizona
residents, will not be enough to confer in personam jurisdiction
over out of state defendants. 36 The Cybersell court stressed that
the website was a passive one, and that defendant did nothing
to encourage anyone in Arizona to log on to its site.
37
The Second Circuit, in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v.
King,38 also refused to find personal jurisdiction over a non-resi-
dent defendant that operated a passive web page that was ac-
cessible to New York residents.39 Here, the defendant operated
a web page to promote his jazz club in Missouri and was sued by
a New York Plaintiff for allegedly infringing on its trademark.
40
The court stated that since no money exchanged hands, no tick-
ets were sent to New York by defendant, and New York re-
sidents would have to pick up tickets in Missouri, defendant did
not purposefully avail itself of the New York market and also,
that the alleged trademark infringement, if at all, occurred in
Missouri.41
The court in Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot
Corn, Inc.4 2 analyzed the above cases and found a common
thread running through them: "the likelihood that personal ju-
risdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly propor-
tionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an
entity conducts over the Internet. ''43 This indeed seems to be a
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See id. at 419, "Here, Cybersell FL has conducted no commercial activity
over the Internet in Arizona. All that it did was post an essentially passive home
page on the web, using the name 'CyberSell,' which Cybersell AZ was in the pro-
cess of registering as a federal service mark. While there is no question that any-
one anywhere could access that home page and thereby learn about the services
offered, we cannot see how from that fact alone it can be inferred that Cybersell FL
deliberately directed its merchandising efforts toward Arizona residents." Id.
38 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
39 See id. at 297.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 299, 301.
42 952 F.Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.Pa. 1997).
43 Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419 (quoting Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1124).
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trend and also is a theory consistent with the requirement that
assertion of personal jurisdiction not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.44 The cases cited above and
others require something more than simply advertising a prod-
uct or service on a website that can be accessed by citizens of
the forum State (as well as anyone around the world).45
The broadest view of Internet jurisdiction for "website only"
cases was stated by the court in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruc-
tion Set, Inc. ,46 where the court found assertion of jurisdiction
proper based only on the defendant's maintenance of a website
that could be accessed by residents of the forum state.4 7 The
court compared defendant's Internet advertisements to adver-
tisements in print publications and decided that the electronic
nature of defendant's advertisements made them more continu-
ous and accessible than those in traditional printed format.48
The court reasoned that these advertisements were sufficient
contacts with the forum to allow the defendant reasonable an-
ticipation of being haled into court there.49 In a broad reading
of the purposeful availment theory, the court held that the post-
ing and maintenance of a website that was accessible to Con-
necticut residents satisfied the test that defendant must avail
itself of the privilege of doing business in the state, thus ob-
taining the protections and benefits of its laws. 50 The court also
proposed that the defendant's website was not only directed at
Connecticut, but to all fifty states, seemingly endorsing a theory
of "jurisdiction anywhere" for Internet sites. 51
This theory was followed by State of Minnesota v. Granite
Gate Resorts, Inc. ,52 a case involving State charges of deceptive
trade practices, false advertising and consumer fraud on the
part of an on-line gambling site based in Nevada.5 3 The court
44 See International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
45 See Bensusan Restaurant Corp., 126 F.3d. at 301; Cybersell, 130 F.3d at
419; CompuServe, Inc., 89 F.3d. at 1264.
46 937 F. Supp.161 (D.Conn. 1996).
47 Id.; see also O'Toole, supra note 26.
48 See Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp.161; see also O'Toole, supra note 26.
49 See id.; see also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 (1980).
50 See Inset Systems, Inc., 937 F. Supp. at 161 (D.Conn. 1996); see also Han-
son, supra note 22.
51 See Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 50; see also O'Toole, supra note 26.
52 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.App. 1997).
53 See id.
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relied on prior Minnesota decisions which held that if a defen-
dant knows its message will be broadcast in that state, they will
be amenable to suit there. 54 The court looked at the fact that
defendant had advertised itself as being available to interna-
tional markets and found they intended to serve all jurisdic-
tions in the market, including Minnesota. 55 The cause of action
was also found to have arisen from defendant's contacts with
the State as the consumer protection action was based on their
advertisements, which reached at least one person in Minne-
sota.56 It is important to note at this point that the website in
this case would be considered a passive one because it was not
accepting bets or money, but simply compiling a mailing list for
future operations.
The above mentioned cases are evidence of a jurisdictional
quagmire, with courts struggling to apply theories and tests
based largely on geographic lines that do not exist in Cyber-
space. As it stands now, the area of personal jurisdiction over
the Internet can best be described as inconsistent, with the
rules being different depending on which Circuit suit is filed in.
The law can not be relied on by those involved in electronic com-
merce via the Internet. The same advertisement or website
that is "passive" in one area of the country, may be found to be
purposeful availment in another. The Circuits are in disagree-
ment and it is time for the matter to be resolved, in this author's
opinion. This may not be far away, as a petition for certiorari is
expected to be filed by the defendant in the Granite Gate case.57
B. Applicable Federal Laws
There are currently three federal statutes which can be ap-
plied by the government to Internet gambling sites: the Federal
Interstate Wire Act,58 the Travel Act,59 and the Organized
54 See id., at 719, see, e.g., Tonka Corp. v. TMS Entertainment, Inc., 638
F.Supp. 386, 391 (D.Minn. 1985); see also BLC Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 359 N.W.2d
752, 755 (Minn.App. 1985).
55 See BLC, supra note 54, at 720.
56 See id. at 721.
57 See Letter from Interactive Gaming Council Chairman Sue Schneider to In-
diana Attorney General Jeff Modisett (visited Nov. 9, 1998) <http://www.igcouncil.
org/opinion/indianal022_full.html> at 6 [hereinafter "Letter"].
58 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).
59 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
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Crime Control Act of 1970.60 These statutes were enacted to
combat the growing problem of organized gambling and the
transmission of gambling information across state lines using
telephones. 61 Since the Internet is a huge web of intercon-
nected computer networks,6 2 linked together using telephone
wires, it is easy to see how the government would try to enforce
these statues, enacted long before the advent of the world wide
web, on Internet gambling activity.
The Wire Act 63 states in pertinent part: "Whoever being
engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses
a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate
or foreign commerce of bets ... or information assisting in the
placing of bets ... on any sporting event or contest ... which
entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of
bets . . .or for information assisting in the placing of bets...
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both."64
To obtain a conviction under the Wire Act the prosecutors
would need to prove that: (1) defendants were engaged in the
business of betting, (2) they knew gambling information was be-
ing communicated through a wire facility, (3) the transmittal
must be in interstate or foreign commerce, and (4) money or
credit must be able to be received in connection with the bets or
information regarding bets. 65 Under this wording, the owners
or operators of a website that accepts bets are definitely break-
ing a Federal law. It also appears that owners or operators of
websites that merely give information or advice about betting
can be charged with violating the Wire Act. Clearly, being in
the business of gambling is a prerequisite to being charged
under the Wire Act and courts have held that the statute does
not cover individual bettors.6 6 By using the Wire Act the Fed-
60 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
61 H.R. Rep. No. 967, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631 (1961).
62 See Hise, supra note 1.
63 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).
64 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994).
65 See id.
66 See id.; see also United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp 324, 329 (D.RI.
1981). Congress did not intend to include a social bettor within the prohibition of
the statute and congress did not contemplate prohibiting the activities of mere
[Vol. 12:153
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eral government is going after organized crime and is not con-
cerned with mere bettors.67
The first arrests for Internet gambling were based on the
Wire Act.68 In actuality the 14 defendants that were arrested
were charged with conspiracy to violate the Wire Act, which
means prosecutors will not have to prove that they violated the
Wire Act, only that they agreed to do so and one of them did an
"overt act" in furtherance of the conspiracy.69 All fourteen peo-
ple charged were United States citizens.70 The FBI seemingly
did this to avoid the complicated question of whether the United
States can arrest and charge a citizen of another country, who
claims to be licensed by his own government.
71
The Travel Act 72 states in pertinent part: "Whoever travels
in interstate or foreign commerce or uses ... any facility in in-
terstate or foreign commerce, with intent to distribute the pro-
ceeds of any unlawful activity; or promote, manage, establish
... any unlawful activity . . .shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than five years, or both... 'unlawful activ-
ity' means (1) any business enterprise involving gambling."73
Courts have held the word "facility" includes telephone
lines and not just physical transportation facilities like cars or
railroads. 74 Since telephone lines can actually transport a voice
or message across state lines to the same extent that illegal
materials can be transported across state lines, communication
facilities are within the reach of the statute. 75 Like the Wire
bettors ... even when they bet large quantities of money and show great sophisti-
cation. Id.
67 See I. Nelson Rose, Internet Operator Arrested, ANDREWS GAMING INDUSTRY
LITIGATION REPORTER, April, 1998.
68 See id.
69 See id. Rose seems to be implying that the U.S. Attorneys used the conspir-
acy theory because the Wire Act is so poorly worded that no one knows if it covers
Internet gambling, and conspiracy is much easier to prove. See id. Overt act has
been defined as: "An open, manifest act from which criminality may be implied.
An outward act done in pursuance and manifestation of an intent or design. An
open act, which must be manifestly proved." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1104 (6th
ed. 1990).
70 See Rose, supra note 67.
71 See id.
72 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
73 Id.
74 See United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907 (E.D.IL 1962).
75 See id.
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Act,76 the Travel Act also can be applied to Internet gambling,
as the statute reaches communications crossing state lines,
which is inherent in Internet gambling. The Travel Act is
broader however, as it does not have the prerequisite of "being
engaged in the business of betting."77 It theoretically could be
used to prosecute mere bettors, although the Federal Govern-
ment is more likely to ignore them and concentrate on organ-
ized crime.78
The Organized Crime Control Act of 197079 states in perti-
nent part: "Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises,
directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both. . . 'illegal gambling business' means a gambling busi-
ness which-(i) is a violation of the law of a state ... in which it
is conducted; (ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, fi-
nance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such bus-
iness; and (iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous
operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross
revenue of $2,000 in any single day." 0
The wording of the statute makes the intent of Congress
clear: the Crime Control Act was enacted to thwart large scale
organized illegal gambling businesses.81 The statute seemingly
would apply to Internet casinos, as long as five or more people
manage or are involved in the day to day activities of the web-
site, and the casino is operational for more than thirty days or
makes $2,000 in a single day.8 2 Under this act, it would be a
federal crime for an Internet Casino to violate any state law, as
long as it meets the five or more persons and more than thirty
days in business requirements.8 3 Obviously, the Crime Control
Act was not aimed at people who are mere bettors over the In-
ternet, but a virtual casino, which is likely to fulfill the five or
more persons requirement, comes within the purview of the
statute. Even if it does not take five people to run a virtual ca-
76 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).
77 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (a) (1994).
78 See Rose, supra note 67.
79 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
80 Id.
81 See I. NELSON ROSE, GAMBLING & THE LAW 49 (1986).
82 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
83 See id.
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sino, it seems very likely that they would have no problem
meeting the $2,000 of revenue in a single day requirement.
The above analysis of the Interstate Wire Act,84 the Travel
Act,8 5 and the Crime Control Act 8 6 shows that these statutes,
which were originally enacted to combat the widespread effect
of illegal gambling and aimed primarily at organized crime
within this country, are applicable to owners or operators of In-
ternet casinos, many of which reside outside of the United
States. Internet casinos are covered by all three statutes and
people who visit these virtual casinos are covered under the
Travel Act.8 7 The key problem for the federal government in
combating on-line gambling will be obtaining jurisdiction over
international defendants and the hazy question of enforcing
United States laws abroad.
C. Attempts to Regulate On-Line Gambling Internally
In response to proposed federal legislation that would make
on-line wagering per se illegal88 and attempted state enforce-
ment of anti-gambling laws toward Internet casinos,8 9 the In-
teractive Gaming Council ("IGC") was formed.90 The IGC has
developed its own code of conduct that mandates (among other
things) accountability and testing, consumer privacy and data
protection, truth in advertising, dispute resolution and the crea-
tion of audit trails.9 1 The IGC agrees with the various federal
and state legislators and Attorneys General that the current
state of unregulated Internet gambling is dangerous to Ameri-
cans in general and minors and compulsive gamblers in particu-
84 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).
85 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
86 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
87 See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1955
(1994).
88 See Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1998, S. 474, 106th Cong.
89 See State of Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715
(Minn.App. 1997).
90 See Letter, supra note 57, at 1. The Interactive Gaming Council is a repre-
sentative and regulatory body of the interactive gaming industry. Id. Formed in
1996 under the auspices of the Interactive Services Association, the IGC has more
than 60 members from around the globe. Id. The IGC is working to address con-
sumer protection issues on its own as they seek a comprehensive regulatory frame-
work for interactive gaming. Id.
91 See Letter, supra note 57, at 1.
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lar.92 Unlike these legislators and law enforcement officials,
the IGC believes regulation, and not prohibition, is the proper
approach to on-line gambling.93 The IGC believes that a prohi-
bition of Internet gambling as opposed to a scheme of regulation
would legislate honest on-line casinos out of business; leaving
only the unscrupulous "fly by night" operators, who will have no
incentive to obey the law. 94 This would truly be ironic: Con-
gress passes legislation to ban Internet gambling instead of reg-
ulating it, leaving Cyberspace open to "fly by night" operations
and organized crime - the very element they were worried about
to begin with.
Regulation, rather than prohibition, seems to be the better
choice in the area of Internet gambling. Common sense sug-
gests that if the government regulates gambling, the criminal or
"bad" element is either taken out of the picture completely or at
least drastically reduced. For example, a typical bettor would
be much more confident that he will collect his winnings in an
Atlantic City or Las Vegas casino, as opposed to the local street
dice game being run by the Mafia or the three card monty game
being run by some "fly by night" operators. Obviously, this is
because the casinos in Atlantic City and Las Vegas are strictly
regulated by the government. The best way to ensure this same
confidence in on-line gambling is for the government to regulate
the industry as they do regular land-based casinos. 95
Strict regulation of Internet gambling would also help to
ensure that minors do not have access to the casinos.9 6 Internet
casinos are already encouraged not to allow minors access to
92 See Testimony of Sue Schneider, Chairman of the Interactive Gaming
Council before the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, May 21, 1998,
(visited Nov. 9, 1998) <http://www.igcouncil.org/opinion/ngiscO525.html> [herein-
after Testimony).
93 See id. at 2. "I don't think that an outright prohibition of Internet gambling
is desirable, even if we could implement such a policy. The solution, I believe, is
regulation. No matter how many honest operators there are out there, without a
viable regulatory framework, the potential for fraud and abuse is quite signifi-
cant." Id.
94 See id. at 3. "If the federal or state government are willing to license and
supervise internet gambling sites the way they license and supervise land-based
casinos, customers will know what they are getting. And as a consumer, why risk
your hard earned cash at www.FlyBynight.org, when you can do the same thing at
www.licenseandregulated.com?" Id.
95 See Testimony, supra note 92.
96 See id.
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their sites. If a minor racks up a large tab on his or her parents'
credit card by gambling on-line, the parents will not be liable for
the debts incurred.9 7 If the on-line casino were licensed by the
state or federal government, it would have even more reason to
ensure that minors did not use their service: they would lose
their license and be out of business.98
In the author's opinion, the Interactive Gaming Council
makes some very good arguments in favor of regulating the on-
line gambling industry and against total prohibition. The In-
ternet is a new and dynamic medium that is helping to develop
new business ideas and has created the term "e-business." In
short, it has changed the way many people do business and the
way consumers purchase goods and services. One of these ser-
vices happens to be entertainment and gambling is a form of
entertainment. Internet gambling should be cultivated for its
tax revenue and regulated to ensure that minors and compul-
sive gamblers are not given access to sites. Because of the
global nature of the Internet, the author agrees with the Inter-
active Gaming Council's suggestion that federal or possibly in-
ternational regulation would be better suited to on-line
gambling than state regulation.9 9 Although regulation of gam-
bling has traditionally been done at the state level, on-line casi-
nos do not adhere to traditional state and country borders and
thus do not adhere themselves to traditional regulatory frame-
work. 100 Due to this non-adherence to regulatory norms, in-
ternet gambling is well suited to regulation at the international
level. It is a new and evolving medium and the problems it
presents know no boundaries. Outdated national laws could be
replaced with new, innovative regulations promulgated at the
international level. However, international regulation of in-
ternet gambling would face one major obstacle: universal ac-
ceptance. 10 1 Without acceptance from the entire international
community, international attempts at regulating on-line gam-
bling would prove futile. Regulation of Internet gambling
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See Letter, supra note 57, at 4.
100 See id.
101 See generally Gambling on the Internet: The Conflict Between Technology,
Policy & Law (visited February 28, 2000), <http://www.commerce.net/events/con-
ference/1996/gambling/section6.html>.
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should be well thought out and reasoned, so that it develops as
the medium does. Outdated existing laws should not be applied
and the Internet should not be chilled as a communications de-
vice before it truly develops.
III. A RECENTLY FILED LAWSUIT IN CALIFORNIA COULD SPELL
MAJOR TROUBLE FOR THE INTERNET GAMBLING INDUSTRY
A. Providian National Bank v. Haines10 2
On June 1, 1998 Providian National bank filed suit against
Cynthia H. Haines in California Superior Court, Marin County
to collect over $70,000 in debts she incurred using her VISA and
MasterCard credit cards, which were issued by the bank. 0 3
Ms. Haines lost the $70,000 to on-line gambling casinos that
accepted her VISA and MasterCard. 10 4 On July 23, 1998 Ms.
Haines filed a cross complaint against Providian National
Bank, VISA International, Inc., MasterCard International, Inc.,
and other credit cards and issuing banks, alleging (among other
things) that the debt she incurred was unenforceable and void
as an illegal contract and that the credit cards and banks had
participated in and profited from unfair business practices. 105
The cross complaint alleges that the credit card companies
have given merchant accounts to various on-line casinos in ex-
change for a percentage of the casino's revenue (estimated at 2
to 5% of the gross revenue charged). 10 6 The cross complaint
states that the VISA and MasterCard trademarks are being ad-
vertised on the on-line casino's Webster and that the merchant
accounts are being used to accept illegal wagers from California
residents.0 7 The cross complaint further alleges that Ms.
Haines and members of the general public of the State of Cali-
fornia were wrongly induced by some of the Internet casinos
into believing that gambling on the Internet was legal in Cali-
fornia.108 Haines alleges that she was wrongfully led to believe
by some of the Internet casinos that since their web servers
102 See Cross Complaint, supra note 6.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See id.; see also CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (1998).
106 See Cross Complaint, supra note 6, at 3.
107 See id.
108 See id. at 14.
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were located outside the United States it was legal for her to
gamble on-line, even though the gambler is located in Califor-
nia, where such gambling is illegal, while performing her end of
the transaction. 10 9 According to Ms. Haines, other on-line casi-
nos were silent on the issue of whether Internet gambling was
legal in the United States and others "buried" their warnings of
illegality on their WebPages so that a reasonable consumer
would not be put on notice. 110
The cross complaint relies heavily on California's long-
standing public policy against gambling in general and gam-
bling on credit in particular.' 1 1 It states that the actions of the
on-line casinos, the credit card companies and the issuing banks
are in violation of California Penal Code provisions against
gaming'1 2 and bookmaking or pool selling,11 3 as well as "other
laws of the State of California and the United Sates of
America."1 14 In addition, Ms. Haines claims that the conduct of
the above-mentioned Cross-defendants constitutes "unfair,
fraudulent and unlawful business practices, in violation of Cali-
fornia Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq."115 Ms.
Haines, in her cross complaint, seeks to enforce the above stat-
utes on behalf of herself and all consumers in California by us-
ing the "Private Attorney General" theory.'1 6
The cross complaint seeks injunctive relief on behalf of Ms.
Haines and the general public of the State of California as well
as restitution for Haines against VISA, MasterCard and the is-
suing banks and money damages. The cross complaint seeks to
enjoin the credit card companies and issuing banks from: (1)
109 See id. at 14-15.
110 Id. at 15. The on-line casinos Ms. Haines claims misled her into believing
on-line gambling was legal in California and accepted bets from her include: Inter-
casino, Casino Fortune, Acropolis Casino, Casino Royale, Cyberthrill Casino, Fal-
ion Casino, Island Casino, Casino of the South Pacific, Real Casino and Grand
Dominican Casino. See Cross Complaint, supra note 6.
111 See id. at 18-19, see infra Section III. B.
112 See Cross Complaint, supra note 6, at 18; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 330.
113 See Cross Complaint, supra note 6, at 18; see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 337(a).
114 See Cross Complaint, supra note 6, at 18; see also infra Section II. B. (dis-
cussing the applicability of the Federal Interstate Wire Act, the Travel Act and the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1952 and 1955 respec-
tively, to gambling on the Internet).
115 Id. at 18-19.
116 See id. at 20, see also CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5.
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providing merchant accounts to on-line gambling casinos that
provide Internet gambling to residents of California; (2) al-
lowing on-line gambling casinos that do business in California
to accept VISA or MasterCard on their websites; (3) allowing
on-line gambling casinos that do business in California to ac-
cept VISA or MasterCard on their website unless they post in
clear and conspicuous language where credit card information
is input by the consumer, that on-line gambling is illegal in Cal-
ifornia; (4) charging, assessing, collecting or attempting to col-
lect any debts or charges that Haines incurred while gambling
on the Internet. 117 Haines also seeks declaratory relief that all
alleged gambling on credit transactions she entered into are
void as illegal an against public policy and thus, unenforceable
and that all or part of the debts on the credit cards were not
authorized by her.118
B. Public Policy Against Contracts for Gambling on Credit
A basic premise of contract law is that the consideration for
a contract must be legal. At common law the courts would not
enforce a contract that was based on unlawful consideration. 1 9
This common law theory was brought over to the United States
from England and has been codified by the States.120 One com-
mon law principle that was codified in England and subse-
quently in America is the public policy against judicial
enforcement of gambling debts.1 21 This principle is deeply
rooted in our Anglo-American judicial system and dates back to
at least 1710, where it was codified in the Statute of Anne.' 22
The Statute of Anne made gambling debts "utterly void, frus-
117 See Cross Complaint, supra note 6, at 26.
118 See id. at 27.
119 Illegal or unlawful consideration has been defined as: "[a]n act which if
done, or a promise which if enforced would be prejudicial to the public interest or
contrary to law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 307 (6th ed. 1990).
120 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1607 ("The consideration of a contract must be lawful
within the meaning of Section 1667"); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1667 ("That is not
lawful which is: 1. Contrary to an express provision of law; 2. Contrary to the pol-
icy of express law, though not expressly prohibited; or, 3. Otherwise contrary to
good morals.")
"21 See Metropolitan Creditors v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 648 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
122 See id. at 648.
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trate and of none effect, to all intents and purposes
whatsoever. '" 123
The underlying principle is easy to grasp: the government
of England and later, the United States did not feel it was in the
public interest to open the courts and the judicial process to peo-
ple who engaged in illegal contracts. Since gambling was
thought to be immoral and reprehensible it was made illegal by
the Statute of Anne. 124 Since gambling was made illegal, a
gambling debt could not be collected on in the courts and a con-
tract extending credit for the purpose of gambling was unen-
forceable. The principle that is harder to grasp is the fact that
while the public and the government's attitude towards gam-
bling has evolved over the years, the law in many states has not
evolved with it and this may cause results in some cases that
seem inequitable.
The Haines cross complaint states that there is strong pub-
lic policy in California against gambling in general and in par-
ticular enforcement of contracts for gambling on credit.1 25
Indeed, upon visiting the website of Ms. Haines' attorney, and
clicking on the icon for more information on the online gambling
case, one comes across the following quote highlighted in a box:
"Did you know that under California law gambling debts are
unenforceable? Click here to read the California Court of Ap-
peal's decision.' 26 By clicking on this box with the wording the
visitor is given a printable version of Metropolitan Creditors
Service of Sacramento v. Sadri,127 the most recent case that
stands for Haines' public policy argument against the enforce-
ability of gambling debts.' 28
In Metropolitan Creditors,129 the plaintiff, a resident of Cal-
ifornia, racked up $22,000 worth of gambling debts at Caesar's
123 Id. at 648 (citing 9 Anne, ch. 14, § 1) (1710).
124 See id.
125 See Cross Complaint, supra note 6, at 3-4; see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 19801(a) (1998) ("The longstanding public policy of this state disfavors the busi-
ness of gambling... nothing herein shall be construed, in any manner, to reflect a
legislative intent to relax those prohibitions.").
126 See Online Gambling Case Information (visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http://www.
techfirm.comlnewpage5.htm> at 1 [hereinafter "Techfirm"].
127 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
128 See id.; see also Techfirm, supra note 126, at 1.
129 See supra note 127.
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Tahoe casino in Nevada.130 He wrote two checks and executed
two notes of indebtedness totaling $22,000 and received casino
chips in return.13 1 He subsequently lost all the chips playing
baccarat and then stopped payment on the checks and notes,
which were drawn on his personal account at a Redwood City,
CA bank. 132
There is a Nevada statute which makes credit instruments
evidencing gambling debts and the underlying debt legal and
enforceable if owed to persons licensed in that state.133 For
some reason, instead of suing in Nevada under this statute,
Caesar's attempted to collect the debts by assigning the claims
to Metropolitan Creditors (a collection agency), who filed suit in
California municipal court.134 That court entered judgment for
debtor and Metropolitan appealed.13 5 Superior court affirmed
and certified the case for transfer to the Court of Appeal. 36
In announcing that California has "always had a strong
public policy against judicial enforcement of gambling debts, go-
ing back virtually to the inception of statehood,"13 7 the Metro-
politan Creditors Court outlined the history of judicial
interpretation of this public policy. The earliest case to test the
public policy against enforcement of gambling debts was Bryant
v. Mead.138 In Bryant, the defendant lost $4,000 playing cards
at an unlicensed gaming house in San Francisco.13 9 The defen-
dant paid the casino owner with two checks, which he later
stopped payment on.' 40 The Court, in refusing to enforce the
debt, stated that "[wiagers, which tend to excite a breach of the
peace, or are contra bonos mores, or which are against the prin-
130 See id. at 647.
131 See id. at 647.
132 See id. at 647.
133 See id. at 647; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.368 (1983). (This statute gives
a cause of action to licensed casino operators in Nevada to pursue gambling debts
in state court. Before this law was enacted gambling debts were unenforceable in
Nevada). See, e.g., West Indies v. First National Bank of Nevada, 67 Nev. 13 (Nev.
1950).
134 Metropolitan Creditors v. Sadri, 19 Ca.Rptr.2d 646, 647 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
135 See id. at 646.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 648.
138 1 Cal. 441 (Cal. 1851).
139 See id.
140 See id.
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ciples of sound policy, are illegal; and no contract arising out of
any such illegal transaction, can be enforced."1 41 Licensed gam-
ing houses were permitted by statute at the time, but the Court
stated that even if plaintiff were licensed, it would not have up-
held the contract. 142
The rule against judicial enforcement of gambling debts
was extended to licensed gaming houses two years later, in Car-
rier v. Brannan.143 The court commented that it was satisfied
that the practice of gambling is vicious and immoral and harm-
ful to society at large. 144 The Court noted that the legalization
of gambling itself did not legalize gambling debts. 145 The Court
reasoned that:
The legislature, finding a thirst for play so universally prevalent
... has attempted to control it . . . by imposing restrictions and
burdens upon persons carrying on this kind of business. The li-
cense simply operates as a permission, and removes or does away
with the misdemeanor which existed at common law, without
changing the character of the contract.' 4 6
Thus, we see the California Supreme Court making a critical
distinction between gambling itself and the enforceability of
contracts for gambling on credit. Almost 150 years later, its
reasoning is still sound: simply because the legislature finds
that a segment of the population engages in games of chance, it
does not follow that the courts must open their doors to enforce-
ment of contracts based on consideration which is contrary to
the established public policy and morals of the community. 47
In a more recent case, Hamilton v. Abadjian, 48 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court once again upheld Bryant,149 Carrier,50 and
141 Id. at 444.
142 See id. ("Such license should not be construed as conferring a right to sue
for a gaming debt, but as a protection solely against a criminal action.") Id. (em-
phasis in original).
143 3 Cal. 328 (Cal. 1853).
144 See id. at 329.
145 See id.
146 Id.
147 See, e.g., Union Collection Co. v. Buckman, 150 Cal. 159 (Cal. 1907) (restat-
ing the rule of Bryant and Carrier in statutory terms). "[Uinder the settled law of
this state the consideration for such notes was contra bonos mores and unlawful."
Id. at 161.
148 30 Cal.2d 49 (Cal. 1947).
149 1 Cal. 441 (Cal. 1851).
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Union Collection Co.,' 5 ' and stated the public policy rule
against enforcement of contracts for gambling on credit in terms
even more analogous to the Haines152 case. 153 The defendant in
Hamilton stopped payment on checks he had given to a Las
Vegas casino totaling $11,450.154 In refusing to enforce the debt
the Hamilton Court reasoned: "The owner of a gambling house
who honors a check for the purpose of providing a prospective
customer with funds with which to gamble and who then partic-
ipates in the transaction thus promoted by his act cannot re-
cover on the check." 155 The Metropolitan Creditors15 6 court
stated that the Hamilton rule was "on all fours" with its case
and announced that if Hamilton still reflects public policy, it
precludes enforcement of Sadri's gambling debts in the State
courts. 157 The Hamilton rule seems to be on all fours with the
Haines'58 case as well. Ms. Haines was extended credit by vari-
ous Internet casinos through the use of her credit cards for gam-
bling. 159 The Internet casinos then participated in the game
with her, thus making the contract for credit against the public
policy of California, void and unenforceable.
The Metropolitan Creditors Court then turned to the ques-
tion of whether or not the public policy of California still disfa-
vored gambling and gambling on credit.160 The Court noted
that since Hamilton'6 ' was decided Nevada made enforceable
by statute credit instruments evidencing debts to licensed gam-
bling operators. 162 The Court considered this point inconse-
quential, however, because the public policy of California and
150 3 Cal. 328 (Cal, 1853).
151 150 Cal. 159 (Cal. 1907).
152 See Cross Complaint, supra note 6.
153 See Hamilton, 30 Cal.2d 49.
154 See id at 50.
155 Id. at 51; accord Braverman v. Horn, 88 Cal. App. 2d 379, 381(Cal. Ct. App.
1948).
156 Metropolitan Creditors v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 649 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
157 Id. at 649, 650.
158 See Cross Complaint, supra note 6.
159 See id.
160 See Metropolitan, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 at 650.
161 See Hamilton u. Abadjian, 30 Cal. 2d 49 (Cal. 1947).
162 See Metropolitan, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 650; see NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.368,
supra note 133.
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not that of Nevada was at issue. 163 The point of consequence for
the Court was that since the rule announced in Hamilton, 164
"the people of California have demonstrated increased tolerance
for gambling through the passage, by initiative measure, of the
California State Lottery Act of 1984."165 The Court agreed that
this and other forms of legalized gambling are evidence that
"California's historical public policy against gambling has been
substantially eroded."' 66
The public policy against gambling in California, as in most
states, has been substantially eroded over time. But it does not
necessarily follow that public policy against gambling on credit
has also eroded. 167 In California this is true because the rule
against enforcing gambling debts has never depended on the
gambling itself being illegal. 168 The fact that one was licensed
to run a gaming house did not confer the right to use the courts
to enforce gambling debts.' 69 This public policy argument is not
unique to California, as courts in several other jurisdictions
have also concluded that a change in public policy towards gam-
bling itself (through legalized forms of gambling, for example),
is not inconsistent with a continued public policy against gam-
bling on credit. 170
A good example of another jurisdiction making the distinc-
tion between gambling and gambling on credit is King Interna-
tional Corp. v. Voloshin.17 ' In this case defendant stopped
payment on a check he gave to a licensed casino in Aruba, in
163 See Metropolitan Creditors v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 650 (Cal. Ct.
App.1993).
164 30 Cal. 2d 49 (Cal.1947).
165 Metropolitan Creditors, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646; see CAL. Gov. CODE § 8880 et
seq.
166 Metropolitan Creditors, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646.
167 See id. at 651.
168 See id.
169 See Bryant v. Mead, 1 Cal. 441 (Cal. 1851); Carrier v. Brannan, 3 Cal. 328;
Hamilton v. Abadjian, 30 Cal.2d 49 (Cal.1947).
170 Metropolitan Creditors 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651-652, citing Carnival Leisure
Industries, Ltd. v. Aubin, 938 F.2d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1991) [Texas]; Resorts Inter-
national, Inc. v. Zonis, 577 F. Supp. 876, 878-879 (D.C. 3rd, 1984); Rose, Gambling
and the Law - Update 1993, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 93. "Even while legal
gambling spreads throughout the country, the public policy of virtually every state
makes legal gambling debts unenforceable, treating a casino marker the same as a
contract for prostitution." Id at 95.
171 366 A.2d 1172 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976).
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exchange for gambling chips and the casino owner sued him in
Connecticut. 172 The court refused to enforce the debt, stating
that even though Connecticut had embraced certain forms of
gambling, the state had "never deviated from its ancient prohi-
bition of gambling on credit."173 The court relied on possible
problems in extending credit to compulsive gamblers as well as
other reasons for the continued public policy against gambling
on credit.' 7 4 This type of reasoning is sound and in the author's
opinion easily extended to gambling over the Internet. If states
are justifiably concerned about extending credit to people who
are gambling in licensed, regulated casinos, that concern can
only be amplified when the gambling is taking place over the
Internet.
C. Full Faith and Credit, Comity and the Judgment/Cause
of Action Distinction
The public policy of the forum becomes the pivotal question
in the cases discussed in Section III B above because they in-
volved the enforcement of intra-state and sister state causes of
action, as opposed to sister state or foreign judgments. The
United States Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and ju-
dicial Proceedings of every other state .. .175 A forum state
must give full faith and credit to a sister state judgment, re-
gardless of the forum state's public policy regarding the under-
lying claim. 176 In contrast, the forum state may refuse to
entertain a lawsuit on a sister state cause of action if enforce-
ment of the action would be contrary to the strong public policy
of the forum state.' 77
California's public policy exception to enforcement of an out
of state cause of action is, like most states, narrow in scope. 178
172 See id.
173 Id. at 1174.
174 See id. at 1174-1175.
175 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
176 See Metropolitan Creditors v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 648 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) citing Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 117 (1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
177 See Metropolitan, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648; see RESTATEmENT, supra note 176
at § 90; see Harrah's Club v. Van Blitter, 902 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1990).
178 Metropolitan Creditors, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 646.
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It applies only where the out of state law violates recognized
standards of morality and the general interests of California cit-
izens. 179 This approach to out of state causes of action was first
announced in 1918 by Justice Cardozo, who explained that
courts should not refuse to enforce such actions unless applying
the foreign law "would violate some fundamental principle of
justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-
rooted tradition of the common weal."180
The above approach to sister state causes of action is com-
parable to the enforcement of a foreign nation judgment. In
California, a foreign nation judgment is not entitled to full faith
and credit, while a sister state judgment would be. "Like a sis-
ter state cause of action, a foreign nation judgment may be re-
fused enforcement if the underlying cause of action is contrary
to the public policy of California."18 1
The application of this standard may not be as cut and
dried as it sounds, however. For example, in Crockford's Club
Ltd. v. Si-Ahmed,182 an English casino obtained a default judg-
ment in England against a California resident who had passed
bad checks to them for gambling chips.18 3 The casino then ob-
tained a default judgment in California and the defendant ap-
pealed.184 The court rejected defendant's argument that since
gambling debts are unenforceable in California, the court
should not enforce the foreign judgment.18 5 In rejecting this ar-
gument, the court stated:
[i]n view of the expanded acceptance of gambling in this state as
manifested by he introduction of the California lottery and other
innovations, it cannot seriously be maintained that enforcement
of said judgment 'is so antagonistic to California public policy in-
terests as to preclude the extension of comity in the present
case.'186
179 Id. at 648-649 citing Wong v. Tenneco, Inc 702 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1985); see
also Knodel v. Knodel, 537 P.2d 353 (1975).
180 Id. at 648, quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111(N.Y. 1918).
181 Id. at 650; see CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 1713.4, subd. (b)(3); see RESTATEMENT
at § 117, cmt. c.
182 203 Cal. App. 3d 1402 (1998).
183 See id.
184 See id.
185 See id. at 1406.
186 See id. at 1406, quoting Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 703 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1985)
(emphasis added).
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This case was distinguished by the court in Metropolitan Credi-
tors'8 7 on the basis that it did not make the "critical distinction
between public acceptance of gambling itself and California's
deep-rooted policy against enforcement of gambling debts-that
is, gambling on credit." 18 It was also distinguished based on
the fact that it did not mention any of the cases on point with
the public policy argument, but simply held that since the State
had expanded its acceptance of gambling, enforcing the English
judgment would not offend public policy.' 8 9 The author sug-
gests that it can be distinguished based on the fact that it was a
foreign judgment. It does not take a huge leap of faith to come
to this conclusion when there is almost 150 years of precedent
denying both California and sister state causes of action for en-
forcement of gambling on credit contracts. Crockford's Club
was decided as it was for comity reasons. The court did not
even mention the applicable case law regarding the public pol-
icy. It saw a foreign judgment and decided to give it full faith
and credit, which it did not have to do. The bottom line for both
sister state Internet casinos and foreign country Internet casi-
nos: if you want to collect gambling debts from a California citi-
zen, get a valid judgment first.190 And if you are an operator of
an Internet casino in a foreign country, you must rely on the
court applying comity principles and ignoring long-standing
public policy considerations against the enforcement of con-
tracts for gambling on credit.
IV. CONCLUSION
The cases discussed in Section II. A. are evidence of a juris-
dictional quagmire, with courts struggling to apply theories and
tests based largely on geographic lines that do not exist in
Cyberspace. As it stands now, the area of personal jurisdiction
187 See Metopolitan Creditors v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 649-651 (Cal. Ct.
App.1993).
188 See id. at 651.
189 See id. at 650, citing Crockford's Club Ltd. v. Si-Ahmed, 203 Cal. App. 3d.
1402 (1988).
190 See Metropolitan Creditors, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 653. ("If a licensed owner of
a Nevada casino wishes to recover on a check or memorandum of indebtedness
given by a California resident under such circumstances, the owner will have to
obtain a Nevada state court judgment ... which will then be entitled to full faith
and credit in California regardless of our public policy.").
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over the Internet can best be described as inconsistent, with the
rules being different depending on which Circuit suit is filed in.
The law can not be relied on by those involved in electronic com-
merce via the Internet. The same advertisement or website
that is "passive" in one area of the country, may be found to be
purposeful availment in another. The Circuits are in disagree-
ment and it is time for the matter to be resolved, in this author's
opinion. The Supreme Court should resolve the split in the Cir-
cuits and provide some clarity to this area of the law.
The analysis of the Interstate Wire Act,191 the Travel
Act,192 and the Crime Control Act' 93 in Section II. B. shows that
these statutes, which were originally enacted to combat the
widespread effect of illegal gambling and aimed primarily at or-
ganized crime within this country, are applicable to owners or
operators of Internet casinos, many of which reside outside of
the United States. Internet casinos are covered by all three
statutes and people who visit these virtual casinos are covered
under the Travel Act.' 94 The key problem for the federal gov-
ernment in combating on-line gambling will be obtaining juris-
diction over international defendants and the hazy question of
enforcing United States laws abroad.
The discussion in Section II. C. concludes that Internet
gambling should be cultivated for its tax revenue and regulated
to ensure that minors and compulsive gamblers are not given
access to sites. Because of the global nature of the Internet, the
author agrees with the Interactive Gaming Council's suggestion
that federal or possibly international regulation would be better
suited to on-line gambling than state regulation. 95 Although
regulation of gambling has traditionally been done at the state
level, on-line casinos do not adhere to traditional state and na-
tional borders and thus do not adhere themselves to traditional
regulatory framework. 96 Due to this non-adherence to regula-
tory norms, Internet gambling is well suited to regulation at the
international level. It is a new and evolving medium and the
191 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).
192 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
193 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
194 See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1955
(1994).
195 See Letter, supra note 57, at 4.
196 See id.
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problems it presents know no boundaries. Outdated national
laws could be replaced with new, innovative regulations
promulgated at the international level. Perhaps the United Na-
tions could attempt to ensure that minors are not allowed ac-
cess to Internet gambling sites through the Convention On the
Rights of the Child.197 However, international regulation of in-
ternet gambling would face one major obstacle: universal ac-
ceptance. 198 Without acceptance from the entire international
community, international attempts at regulating on-line gam-
bling would prove futile. Regulation of Internet gambling
should be well thought out and reasoned, so that it develops as
the medium does. Outdated existing laws should either be re-
vised or modernized, or not applied to the Internet at all.
The discussion in Section III leads the author to conclude
that the plaintiff in Haines1 99 has more than a leg to stand on;
she has almost 150 years of precedent and long-standing, strong
public policy grounds to stand on. For her to lose her case, the
court would have to abandon this precedent and fly in the face
of the doctrine of stare decisis. 20 0 Time and time again, the Cal-
ifornia courts have been asked to abandon their public policy
against gambling on credit, and each time they have refused,
most recently in 1993.201 If they will not enforce contracts for
gambling on credit made in person, it is reasonable to believe
they will be even more reluctant to enforce those made in cyber-
space. This author predicts Ms. Haines will win her case and
send shock waves throughout the Internet gambling industry.
197 See General Assembly Commemorates Tenth Anniversary of Convention On
Rights of Child (visited February 28, 2000) <http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/ 1999). "The Convention, adopted in 1989 and now the most broadly ratified
United Nations Treaty, recognizes the particular vulnerability of children and
brings together in one comprehensive code, benefits and protection for children
concerning all categories of human rights." Id.
198 See Gambling on the Internet: The Conflict Between Technology, Policy &
Law (visited February 28, 2000) <http://www.commerce.net/events/conference/
1996/gambling/section6.html>.
199 See Cross Complaint, supra note 6.
200 Stare decisis has been defined as: "To abide by or adhere to decided cases; to
stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
1406 (6th ed. 1990).
201 See Metropolitan Creditors v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 648 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
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If on-line casinos cannot accept credit cards from citizens of cer-
tain states, the industry would appear to be doomed.20 2
Charles B. Brundage
202 See Beer, supra note 6.
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